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Les Mains Sales: The Ethical and
Political Implications of SLAPP Suits
Richard 0. Brooks*
I. Introduction
As environmentalists, we like to think of ourselves as the
protagonists in a morality play - the champions of environ-
mental harmony doing battle with the forces of greed and ig-
norance. We continue the tradition of Joseph Campbell's
Hero with a Thousand Faces.1 Unstained by original sin or
"les mains sales" (dirty hands),2 we claim to be able to do bat-
tle without wrestling with the state of our own souls.' The
struggle is claimed to lie outside ourselves - a Manichean
struggle between the forces of good and evil.4 We know which
side we are on.
The latest version of this morality drama is the story of
the Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP).
According to the legal-scholar vagabonds who sing to us this
modern tale, the "enemy" is the greedy and ignorant devel-
oper. He uses the "tarnished and suspect" mechanism of the
legal system to deceitfully twist the enabling democratic pro-
cess of citizen participation into a grubby, expensive, and in-
* Richard 0. Brooks is a Professor of Law at the Environmental Law Center of
the Vermont Law School, of which he is a former director. He is a former consulting
attorney for the Natural Resources Defense Council and a former Professor of Law at
the University of Rhode Island.
1. J. CAMPBELL, HERO WITH A THOUSAND FACES (1968).
2. J.P. SARTRE, LES MAINS SALES, No ExIT AND THREE OTHER PLAYS 125 (1989).
3. See T. SHAFFER, AMERICAN LEGAL ETHICS (1985) (An author sensitive to the
need for lawyers to struggle with themselves).
4. P. ALFARIC, LES ECRITURES MANICHENES (1918).
5. Canan & Pring, Studying Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation:
Mixing Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches, 22 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 384 (1988);
Canan & Pring, Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, 35 Soc. PROBS. 506
(1988).
1
62 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
timidating countersuit to further his evil efforts to rape
Mother Nature. We all hope that the tale has a happy ending.
The rule of law, embodied in neutral constitutional principles,
statutes, the rules of procedure, and the Model Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility, can stop the evildoers and punish
them.
I do not propose to simply debunk this satisfying myth in
order to wallow in a curiously-satisfying-perverse cynicism. I
do believe that environmentalists often do good and that de-
velopers often do harm to Mother Nature. I will argue, how-
ever, that we environmentalists must recognize that we have
"dirty hands," soiled often by the questionable motives of our
clients and our methods. Ironically, the developers' alleged
transformation of a political struggle into a legal battle is a
time-honored trick perfected by the reformer, not the devel-
oper.7 I will further suggest that contrary to our deepest be-
liefs, the rule of law and procedural due process will rescue
neither us, the environmentalists, nor the developers, from
our bitter little struggles. Unable to find solace in "an objec-
tive law," we will have the difficult task of justifying our ac-
tions by appeal to, at best, arguable substantive moral stan-
dards, while paradoxically committing ourselves to an uneasy
political struggle. This will lead us back into necessarily
stained professional conduct. The end of the tale is not tri-
umph, but "troubled sleep."'
Anyone who has practiced law knows that intimidation
runs throughout the law. It is an integral part of everyday
functioning of the law. The authors of the studies on SLAPP
suits have posed a problem much larger than simply the prob-
lem of developer countersuits.9 That is, what is the relation-
ship between bona fide law suits on the one hand, and the
exercise of force on the other?
The recognition of such intimidation has a long history.
6. This recognition of our own dirty hands was forcefully brought to my atten-
tion by D. LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE 317 (1988).
7. S. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS (1974).
8. J.P. SARTRE, TROUBLED SLEEP (1950).
9. Canan & Pring, supra note 5.
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Since some of you in the conference quoted Aristotle, and
others quoted de Tocqueville, I will remind you of Book I of
Plato's Republic,0 in which Thrasymachus, arguing with Soc-
rates about the nature of justice becomes fractious. Socrates
says, wait a minute, you're trying to push me around. You're
not really willing to enter into a dialogue. You really want to
win this argument through the sheer force of your personality
and intimidation. Socrates then suggests that this is not a way
in which a rational dialogue can take place.
I would suggest to you that the discourse in Plato's Re-
public may have been the beginning of a long history of intim-
idation in discourses over the nature of law and justice. Un-
derlying that history is the reality of inequality of resources in
the legal process." I would urge Professors Canan and Pring,
who have done such marvelous work on the SLAPP issue, to
view it as part of the more general role of intimidation in the
legal process. Such an inquiry should lead to the question:
What are the appropriate and feasible ways of controlling in-
timidation in the legal process?
II. The Search for Principles for Deterring Improper
Countersuits
Let me give you, in typical law school fashion, the hy-
potheticals which we did not have this morning, the
counterhypotheticals. First, consider that a developer wants
to build a large manufacturing plant with federal and state
assistance. This plant would be in violation of the Clean Air
Act' 2 or the Clean Water Act. 13 Operation of the plant will
result in pollution and the resultant unregulated environmen-
tal harm. An environmental group, composed of citizens af-
fected and citizens genuinely interested in the environment,
brings an action to force compliance. The corporation which is
building the plant countersues on one of the grounds found in
10. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC, BOOK I (F.M. Cornford trans. 1945).
11. J. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE (1976).
12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988).
13. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1987 & Supp. 1990).
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traditional SLAPP suits." I think this is the kind of lawsuit
we have all been talking about this morning.
Second, suppose that a town wants to build a large re-
cycling center. Although stringently regulated, the center may
change the character of the neighborhood. The neighbors,
worried about their property values, decide to oppose it on
environmental grounds, or at least to delay the plant until
they can sell their homes or bargain for damages or modifica-
tions to the plant.'5 The town countersues.
Third, suppose a group of businessmen sue to stop the
federally-assisted recycling center from being located near the
business center. They believe that the recycling center, pro-
moted by a citizens' group of environmentalists, will genuinely
affect the environment of their small village business center. 6
The recycling center's builders countersue, believing that they
have done careful studies, and that the center will actually di-
minish environmental harm from the existing waste system.
Now let us examine these three cases and suggest how we
might approach them.
Initially, we could approach these examples on the basis
of our substantive pro-environmental biases. We would clearly
reject the countersuits in example number one. After all, the
corporation building this manufacturing plant does not have
any right to bring a suit in that case. We might have more
doubts in example number two, especially in light of the moti-
vations of the citizens and the desirability of a recycling
center. We may support the countersuit in number three de-
pending on the merits of the particular study of the environ-
ment concluded by the builders of the recycling center. Most
members of interest groups would take this approach.
We lawyers and law students, although happy to re-
present these interests, believe that they are transcended ei-
14. Canan & Pring, supra note 5.
15. In my experience, it is not uncommon to locate recycling centers and inciner-
ators in or near low-income areas. See R. Brooks, The Regulation of Garbage-Burning
Incinerators in Vermont: The Vicon Experience and Beyond (Sept. 1986) (unpub-
lished manuscript on file with the author).
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ther by a neutral rule or a majority-adopted law. Therefore,
the second approach and the approach which law schools
often try to teach, not always very satisfactorily, is to develop
neutral satisfactory rules that apply to all three cases. And
what are the neutral satisfactory rules? We have discussed
some of them in our conference already. We were given a list
of them by our last speaker," and they are very interesting.
We could appeal to constitutional law on the theory that
somehow, out of constitutional law, we can find some princi-
ples that guide us in these cases. I refer the reader to the arti-
cle by Professor Stein"s and ask whether the rules he proposed
resolve our problem. I might also say that although I am not a
constitutional lawyer, and with great wariness even suggest
this, I believe there is what is called a "sham exception" to
the Pennington-Noer doctrine.' 9 This indeed clouds the issue
a bit, more than perhaps Professor Stein had time to present
this morning. If I am correct and there is an exception, then
indeed reliance upon constitutional doctrine may be question-
able. A lawyer may say that my countersuit is not a sham and
hence is exempt. I am going to bring an action here and I
should not get clobbered on constitutional grounds.
I am going to skip over the statutory amendment to the
Civil Rights Law that has been proposed as a neutral rule for
handling this. 0 That rule was so well handled in the com-
ments by our principal speakers.2' However, I must say, com-
menting solely as an environmentalist, I would not like this
particular rule myself, and perhaps I might be delighted at a
later time to talk about this.
We can look at Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure22 and its state equivalents; in short, we can look for a
17. See Stein, SLAPP suits: A Slap at the First Amendment, 7 PACE ENVTL. L.
REV. 45 (1989).
18. Id.
19. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127
(1961); United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
20. Proposed amendments to N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 70, 76 (Consol. 1990) (ad-
ding new sections 70-a, 76-a) (proposed June 7, 1990).
21. See Canan & Pring, supra note 5.
22. FED. R. Civ. P. 11. See Graham, Navigating Between the Scylla of Tolerating
Litigation Abuse and the Charybdis of Chilling Legitimate Advocacy: An Overview
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neutral procedural rule. 3 The problems with implementing
Rule 11 suggest that it will not provide the answers we seek.
The third approach, which I sense is the approach which
our scientific study of countersuits took this morning, is what
I will call, for lack of a better title, the "critical legal studies
approach."" This approach says, thank you very much,
Brooks, for those hypotheticals, but they are irrelevant to the
case. The fact of the matter is that, if you look historically,
what you find is that the only countersuits that are brought
are by these rotten, greedy developers, perhaps like those in
example one. Consequently, your second and third hypotheti-
cals are irrelevant! That is an interesting assertion. It is an
assertion which I would like to see buttressed by an appropri-
ate empirical survey of the range of cases which would give
rise to spurious suits or countersuits. I would suggest that the
research of our colleagues, Professors Canan and Pring, is un-
consciously biased in the selection of those suits. They have
not picked up on those suits where environmentalists have
abused the legal process. 5
The fourth and final approach to the hypotheticals I have
listed is an approach that does not simply examine history,
but also tries to articulate normative ethical standards for
what should be done in each particular case. This is the ap-
proach which I am going to argue for and which is different
from the approach that tries to articulate neutral satisfactory
rules. One source of these substantive rules, the ethical rules,
are the rules governing the legal profession. We should ask
whether these rules provide for adequate standards in these
particular cases. Let me flatly state the arguable proposition
that the rules of professional responsibility do not provide an
adequate basis for curbing these kinds of lawsuits. There is a
reason for this. If one looks at the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility or the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
of Federal Rule 11 and Comparable Ohio Provisions, 18 CAP. U.L. REV. 1 (1989).
23. Id.
24. M. KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987).
25. Admittedly, this is more difficult to do, and would require a review of cases
in which environmentalists brought irivilous suits or sought to delay projects.
[Vol. 7
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which are adopted in some states, you will find that basically,
they tend to be totally committed to a principle of partisan-
ship and non-accountability of the lawyer." By this I mean
they explicitly or tacitly expect the lawyer to be a "hired
gun," to represent a client zealously, to consult with a client
regarding the client's purposes, but not to be responsible for
the morality of the client's purposes. The underlying model
for the rules of professional responsibility, I would argue, is
that the attorney's job is to defend zealously the client's
rights. This advocacy view, best applicable to criminal cases,
is also carried over to civil cases and indeed to bargaining
outside the courtroom. Very specifically, the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility, concerning the representation of
a client within the bounds of law, states that an attorney shall
not: "[f]ile a suit, assert a position, conduct a defense, delay a
trial, or take other action on behalf of his client when he
knows or when it is obvious that such action would serve
merely to harass or maliciously injure another."2 In addition,
an attorney in representing a client shall not: "[k]nowingly
advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted under existing
law, except that he may advance such claim or defense if it
can be supported by good faith argument for an extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law."28 The so-called sub-
jective test has been applied to the meaning of "good faith."
Hence "good faith" is what the lawyer believes is good faith.
If any of you, like myself, have had much to do with the de-
velopers' lawyers, the fact of the matter is that they are ready
to believe at a moment's notice that most of their SLAPP
suits are probably well justified. This is illustrated by the fact
that they have advanced such legal claims as inverse condem-
nation and "unconstitutional taking" with great regularity
over fifty years, despite the fact that those claims have been
knocked down again and again. I used to think that it was
simply either that they were dumb or that they were tricky,
but the fact of the matter is that they genuinely believe that
26. D. LUBAN, supra note 6, at 393.
27. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(1) (1986).
28. Id. DR 7-102(A)(2).
1989]
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property is being "taken" by regulation. In fact, the Supreme
Court may finally be beginning to agree with them.29
Some states adopt a different ethical code called the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct. There is a somewhat
different standard in these rules which talks about "meritori-
ous claims" and contentions: "A lawyer shall not bring or de-
fend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, un-
less there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which
includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification
or reversal of existing law." 0 This, by the way, has been inter-
preted in terms of an objective test; that is, the notion that a
reasonable person looking at the action could say yes, that is a
reasonable action to bring in this particular case."1
The question then is whether the SLAPP defenses raised
have been reasonable ones. In the cases I have looked at, Bell
v. Mazza,32 Missouri v. NOW,33 and Sierra Club v. Butz,3 4 the
courts wrote very long opinions indicating that the counter-
suits are being treated seriously. Courts appear to have a very
difficult time with them. There are dissents in many of the
cases where the countersuit is being dismissed. 5 In short,
these are arguable decisions. A lawyer looking at appellate
court decisions would not necessarily be discouraged from
bringing countersuits.
Of course, the lower court experience with SLAPP suits
may be different. Professors Canan and Pring talked this
morning about only twenty percent of such countersuits being
successful. They appear to suggest that one is either a really
"dumb" or evil lawyer if one takes a one-in-five chance on a
legal action. I am not so sure about that. I would be delighted
to hear, for example, from tort lawyers, particularly personal
injury lawyers, or any lawyers taking actions on a contingency
fee basis whether they think a one-in-five chance is an outra-
29. Recently, the Supreme Court has entertained inverse condemnation claims.
30. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 (1983).
31. Id. The key language here is, "unless there is a basis for doing so ...." Id.
32. 394 Mass. 176, 474 N.E.2d 1111 (1985).
33. 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1980).
34. 349 F. Supp. 934 (M.D. Cal. 1972).
35. 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1980).
[Vol. 7
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol7/iss1/15
1989] ETHICAL AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS 69
geous thing to do. 6 Succeeding on only a twenty percent basis
does not seem to me to be a tremendously persuasive argu-
ment for establishing a non-meritorious claim.
My central point is that it does not seem that interpret-
ing these claims either on objective or subjective grounds
under the legal ethics provisions would necessarily find a law-
yer unethical. I defer to those who have studied these actions
at the lower court level because the suits may be less deserv-
ing at that level.
What is wrong with relying upon the ethical rules of pro-
fessional conduct? I think the whole premise of our discussion
up until now is that somehow the ethics that justify what law-
yers should do is enshrined in the various rules of professional
ethics and that these rules should be the rules of the gladia-
tor; that is, the only rules of the advocacy system. I would like
to suggest to you that reliance on professional rules is not in-
tellectually correct or morally right, that the advocacy system
and its current set of legal ethical rules is seriously flawed,
and that it is based on a series of erroneous ethical theories.
The ethical rules of the profession may be tacitly based on the
notion of legal realism, that is, the notion that somehow law-
yers are neutral parties simply given the responsibility to pre-
dict what the courts are going to do.37 I do not think that is a
lawyer's central job.
Alternatively, the advocacy ethic may be based upon a
"bad man theory"; somehow the law is simply supposed to
curb the "bad man" and the lawyer should proceed, as Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr. said, as if representing a bad man when
he approaches the law."8 In any case, I think this is a falla-
cious theory. It ignores the fact that the law has substantive
moral content and that it seeks to promote cooperation and
36. I suppose their answer might depend on how many billable hours they have
and what other kinds of lawsuits they have in front of them. As a matter of fact,
there is an empirical theory which indicates that lawyers' willingness to take
"chancy" contingency fee suits depends on what other suits they have "in the hop-
per" at that particular time.
37. The following discussion is based upon the more extensive arguments of
David Luban. See D. LUBAN, supra note 6.
38. Id. at 20.
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not merely advocacy.
The third notion justifying the current ethical rules is
that this system of law is an adversarial system, which reveals
the truth. Even if this were true, and few believe that advo-
cacy does reveal the truth, that revelation would be true in
only very narrow, limited circumstances. These circumstances
would best fit the criminal defense system where the issue is
not so much truth as it is defending the autonomy of the indi-
vidual from the force of the state. 9 Since we are talking about
SLAPP civil suits here, at least for the most part, I am in-
clined to think that the paradigm of criminal actions as a ba-
sis of the advocacy ethic is not applicable.
Finally, the advocacy ethic is justified by saying, this is
my role as a lawyer; I am an advocate; I represent the interest;
I am told what to represent; I march into court. I do not think
this is a persuasive argument, because the roles we have in
society must also have their moral justification. We cannot
simply say, this is my role. We have to prove that role is part
of an institution that serves some form of moral good.40 In
summary, I think the traditional justification for this set of
professional moral rules is erroneous and therefore, to be led
into a discussion of these rules ignores the fact that such a
discussion takes us away from some fundamental ethical
considerations.
III. The Need for Substantive Ethical Standards
What can we do instead? We can ask some very basic
moral questions which are difficult to answer. Is the lawyer
who is engaging in a SLAPP suit in a mode of practice which
inflicts unjustifiable damage on others? Is the lawyer involved
in deceit? Is the lawyer involved in manipulations which vio-
late the spirit and generality of the law as a whole? Is the
lawyer pursuing substantially unjust results?41 These are very
broad questions, but they are no less valid for being broad.
These questions cut both ways. Our first example, a man-
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ufacturing plant opposed by environmentalists, would suggest
that they would imply that a countersuit may be improper,
resulting in unjustifiable damage and manipulation of the law.
On the other hand, where a citizen group of property owners
is engaged in a battle against a recycling center, it may also, in
fact, inflict unjustifiable damage on those people who are, in
effect, customers and beneficiaries of the recycling center. It
may violate the spirit and generality of the law and may in-
deed be an unjust result to stop the building of the recycling
center. I say may be and not, must be. It may be, for example,
if the lawyer for the citizen group says this recycling center is
in fact doing very real harm to the nearby neighbors' property
values and they are not being compensated for that harm as
they should be compensated for it.12 So under those circum-
stances, it may be fair to take action of some sort or another.
The important thing is that one must weigh the basic moral
value of the lawsuit in the specific case."3 This is the basic
lesson.
IV. "Dirty Hands"
Most environmental groups do not weigh the moral value
of their suits apart from their political context. As an environ-
mental attorney, I do not do so either. Many environmental
groups and lawyers view themselves as part of an ongoing po-
litical battle. Some environmental lawyers, especially in Ver-
mont, Oregon and a few other environmentally-sensitive
states see themselves as part of the political movement. They
see law and lawyering as part of a political movement. I am
part of this group. We believe that as part of this political
movement, we are going to get "dirty hands." We are going to
do some things which, from a substantive moral view, would
be moral violations.
Let me tell you some of the things I have done. I have
42. Brion, An Essay On LuLu, Nimby and the Problem of Distributive Justice,
15 ENVTL. AFF. 437 (1988).
43. The specific justice-based evaluation of lawyers' actions is set forth in SHAF-
FER, AMERICAN LEGAL ETHICS (1985); see.also Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyer-
ing, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1083 (1988).
1989]
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represented a group of citizens over a three year period who
ultimately stopped a resource recovery facility - a euphe-
mism for a place that burns garbage. Many of those citizens
who came to me initially were primarily interested in their
property values and neighborhood amenities. They were the
citizens living right next to the plant. Not one of them had
been involved in environmental action before the plant was to
be built; not one of them showed any history of environmental
activism at all; nor have most of them (since they succeeded
in stopping the plant) been involved in any other environmen-
tal action.44
In taking these actions, I contested the air quality permit,
a utility siting permit and, along with other groups, upset a
special subsidized-electricity rate for this plant. In probable
violation of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility,5 I
worked with a publicity agent and used continuous publicity
on behalf of this lawsuit at all stages. On several of the ac-
tions, I acted in a clearly subservient manner to the judgment
of the citizens' group despite the abjurations of the code re-
garding independent judgnent.4 e I do not think I am atypical.
I practiced as a land use attorney in Connecticut for more
than ten years, was a consulting attorney for Natural Re-
sources Defense Council for three years in Connecticut and
Rhode Island, and have directed the Environmental Law
Center for the past ten years. I have observed that a fair
amount of this kind of action goes on each and every day by
environmental action groups across the country.
What is the justification? The justification does not rest
upon neutral legal principles nor upon fixed lawyering ethical
codes, nor can the justifications be based upon substantive
moral standards. The justification rests upon our appeal to
politics rather than ethics.
This morning, Professors Canan and Pring have raised
some very basic theoretical and practical problems about
44. Although motives may not be relevant under formal ethics rules, they may be
relevant to substantive moral evaluation.
45. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-107 (1986).
46. Id. Canon 5.
[Vol. 7
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politics and its relation to law. Their work poses the question:
When is it appropriate to translate a political action into a
legal action? Interestingly enough, they accuse the developers
of promoting this transformation. However, we environmental
lawyers "invented" the activity. We delight in taking political
actions through legal channels. Those in the civil rights move-
ment, and a wide range of other people, took actions that
were, in effect, "political" actions and translated them into
court actions.
So the question becomes a much more difficult one. When
is it appropriate to do that? Under what circumstances? From
a legal point of view, these are arguments that have a consti-
tutional dimension, i,.e., the nature of a political question, and
the propriety of the court screening-out certain political ques-
tions.4 7 From the viewpoint of social and political philosophy,
the justification rests on the fact that environmentalists feel
that they are engaged in a political battle, a political battle in
which the existing democratic system and the existing court
system is corrupted, by money, an imbalance of wealth, and
by institutional inertia."8 As a consequence, many of the ac-
tions taken by environmentalists and their lawyers may be
understood only in light of this political battle.
In a partially unjust community, parties cannot act ac-
cording to the prevailing standards of justice and succeed in
moving the community to be better. This is not a "clean
hands" justification. It is a "dirty hands" defense, but I be-
lieve it. I do not feel righteous about it. I think "dirty hands"
is where we are in the environmental movement.
For those who believe, as I think some do here, that we
can keep our hands clean and fight environmental battles, and
that the other side is merely a group of "rotten" people issu-
ing SLAPP suits, I think they are wrong. The problem with
the SLAPP suits is not that they are ethically wrong - of
course they are. But the problem is that the developers are on
the wrong side of the war. Their "dirty hands" are not justi-
fied, our "dirty hands" are. And so, I sound an off-key note in
47. See BICKEL, The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 65-75 (1962).
48. D. LUBAN, supra note 6, at 358.
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this particular conference today by suggesting that the moral-
ity play of SLAPP suits is not the entire song. I nonetheless
thank you for listening to my supplementary tune.
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol7/iss1/15
